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PURCHASING ITEM FOR COUNCIL AGENDA

1. Agenda Item Number: 18

2. Council Meeting Date: February 24, 2011

TO: MAYOR & COUNCIL

THROUGH: CITY MANAGER

3. Date Prepared: February 10, 2011

4. Requesting Department: Police

5. SUBJECT: Amendment No. 2 to Agreement PD7-918-2382 for Photo Enforcement with Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., in an estimated amount of $650,000.00.

6. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend approval of Amendment No. 2 to Agreement PD7-918-2382 for Photo Enforcement with Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., in an estimated amount of $650,000.00.

7. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION In 2001, the City implemented a photo red light program, which included enforcement at four intersections. The program was expanded to eight intersections soon after implementation. During 2005, the City conducted pilot speed enforcement at three of the intersections. Additional intersections were enhanced with speed enforcement capabilities in 2007. The City currently has twelve (12) equipped intersections, actively utilizing Redflex Traffic Systems, with twenty-two (22) various approaches.

Based on data collected from the current photo red light program and the speed enforcement program, City staff believes renewing the contract will continue to increase safety on the City streets. The recommended amendment to the agreement will continue to provide photo speed and photo red light enforcement at twelve (12) intersections.

8. EVALUATION PROCESS: In February of 2007, City Council awarded Agreement PD7-918-2382 for photo enforcement. The Agreement was awarded with a three-year term and provisions to extend for two additional three-year terms. In March of 2010, the agreement was extended for one year. Staff is recommending that the Agreement be extended for two years with provision to extend for one additional three-year term.

9. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS: Funds for the requested service will come from General Fund, Non-Departmental, Photo Red Light (101.1290.0000.5263).

10. PROPOSED MOTION: Move to approve Amendment No. 2 to Agreement PD7-918-2382 for Photo Enforcement to Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., in an estimated amount of $650,000.00.

APPROVALS

11. Requesting Department Gregg Jacquin, Police Commander	**12. Department Head** Sherry Kiyler, Police Chief
13. Acting Procurement Manager Mike Mandt, CPPB	**14. Acting City Manager** Rich Dlugas

AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO,
TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHANDLER
AND
REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS, INC.
FOR PHOTO ENFORCEMENT SERVICE
AGREEMENT NO. PD7-918-2382

Whereas, the City Council of the City of Chandler authorized the City of Chandler (hereinafter referred to as "CITY") and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as "CONTRACTOR") to enter into an Agreement for photo enforcement (hereinafter referred to as "AGREEMENT") executed on March 7, 2007; and

Whereas, the AGREEMENT provided for the commencement of the contract upon execution and continuation of the AGREEMENT for three (3) years from completion of the installation of CONTRACTOR'S system at the sixth (6^{th}) intersection unless sooner terminated in accordance with the provisions of the AGREEMENT; and

Whereas, the AGREEMENT further provided that CITY reserved the right, by mutual agreement, to extend the Contract for up to two (2) additional terms of three (3) years each for a total of nine (9) years; and

Whereas, Amendment Number One to the AGREEMENT, executed March 18, 2010, amended the Term of the AGREEMENT to extend for one additional term of one year beginning on March 7, 2010, and ending on March 6, 2011, and further provided that CITY reserved the right, by mutual agreement, to extend the contract one additional term; and

Whereas CITY and CONTRACTOR have determined that it would be in the best interest of CITY and CONTRACTOR to go back to the original understanding as to the Term of the AGREEMENT; and

NOW THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

1. Section 5 of the AGREEMENT as amended is hereby deleted and amended to read:

"**5. Term**: This contract is extended to reinstate the parties to the same position had the AGREEMENT been extended as provided for in the AGREEMENT. The one year period from March 7, 2010 through March 6, 2011 shall the first year of the second three year term of the AGREEMENT. The second term of the AGREEMENT is from March 7, 2010 to March 6, 2013. CITY reserves the right, by mutual agreement to extend the AGREEMENT one additional three year term as provided for in the AGREEMENT."

2. All other terms and conditions of the AGREEMENT shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed their names this ___ day of ___________, 2011.

CITY OF CHANDLER:

By: ________________________
Mayor

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

____
City Attorney

ATTEST:

____
City Clerk

CONTRACTOR, Inc.,

By: Karen Finley
Title: CEO

ATTEST: (If corporation)

____
Secretary

WITNESS: (If individual Or Partnership)

____

[SEAL]

Effects of Red Light Camera Enforcement on Fatal Crashes in Large US Cities

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February 2011

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Abstract

Objective: To estimate the effects of red light camera enforcement on per capita fatal crash rates at intersections with signal lights.

Methods: From the 99 large US cities with more than 200,000 residents in 2008, 14 cities were identified with red light camera enforcement programs during 2004-08 but not during 1992-96, and 48 cities were identified without camera programs during either period. Analyses compared the citywide per capita rate of fatal red light running crashes and the citywide per capita rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections during the two study periods, and rate changes then were compared for cities with and without cameras programs. Poisson regression was used to model crash rates as a function of red light camera enforcement, land area, and population density.

Results: The average annual rate of fatal red light running crashes declined for both study groups, but the decline was larger for cities with red light camera enforcement programs than for cities without camera programs (35 vs. 14 percent). The average annual rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections decreased by 14 percent for cities with camera programs and increased slightly (2 percent) for cities without cameras. After controlling for population density and land area, the rate of fatal red light running crashes during 2004-08 for cities with camera programs was an estimated 24 percent lower than what would have been expected without cameras. The rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections during 2004-08 for cities with camera programs was an estimated 17 percent lower than what would have been expected without cameras.

Conclusions: Red light camera enforcement programs reduce the citywide rate of fatal red light running crashes and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections. Cities wishing to reduce fatal crashes at signalized intersections should consider red light camera enforcement.

1. Introduction

More than 2.2 million police-reported motor vehicle crashes in the United States in 2009 occurred at intersections or were intersection related, accounting for about 41 percent of all police-reported crashes. These crashes resulted in 81,112 serious nonfatal injuries and 7,358 deaths. About one-third of the deaths occurred at intersections with signal lights (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2010a).

Running a red light is a common traffic violation. A study of traffic at 19 intersections in 4 states reported an average of 3.2 red light running events per hour per intersection (Hill and Lindly, 2003). In a national telephone survey conducted in 2010, 93 percent of drivers said it is unacceptable to go through a red light if it is possible to stop safely, but one-third reported doing so in the past 30 days (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2010).

The safety consequences of running red lights are considerable. A study of urban crashes reported that running red lights and other traffic controls was the most common type of crash (22 percent). Injuries occurred in 39 percent of crashes in which motorists ran traffic controls (Retting et al., 1995). In 2009, 676 people were killed and 113,000 were injured in crashes in which police were able to establish that drivers ran red lights. Sixty-four percent of these deaths were people other than the red light runners, including passengers in the red light running vehicles, occupants of the other vehicles, pedestrians, and bicyclists. Compared with the drivers involved in these crashes who did not violate the signal, red light runners were more likely to be male, to be younger than 30, and to have prior crashes, alcohol-impaired driving convictions, or citations for speeding or other moving violations. Violators also were much more likely to have been speeding or alcohol impaired at the time of the crash, and less likely to have had a valid driver's license (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2010b).

A high likelihood of apprehension helps convince motorists to comply with traffic laws, but many enforcement agencies have insufficient personnel to mount effective enforcement programs using traditional police patrols. Red light cameras can supplement traditional methods of enforcement at intersections, especially at times of the day and on roads where traditional enforcement can be difficult or hazardous. Studies have reported reductions in red light violations of 40-96 percent after the introduction of red light cameras (Retting et al., 1999a, 1999b; Retting et al., 2008), and reductions occurred not only at camera-equipped sites but also at signalized intersections without cameras. A study of the impact of red light camera enforcement on crashes in Oxnard, California, one of the first US communities to employ such cameras, reported significant citywide reductions in crashes at intersections with traffic signals, with injury crashes reduced by 29 percent (Retting and Kyrychenko, 2002). Right-angle collisions, the crash type most closely associated with red light running, at these intersections declined by 32 percent, and right-angle crashes involving injuries fell by 68 percent.

Some studies have reported that even though red light cameras reduce front-into-side collisions and overall injury crashes, they can increase rear-end crashes. A study evaluating red light camera programs in 7 communities reported a 25 percent reduction in right-angle crashes, whereas rear-end crashes increased by 15 percent. Because the types of crashes prevented by red light cameras tend to be more severe and more costly than the additional rear-end crashes that can occur, the study estimated a positive social benefit of more than $18.5 million in the 7 communities (Council et al., 2005). Not all studies have reported increases in rear-end crashes. A review of 10 controlled before-after studies of red light camera effectiveness that adjusted for regression to the mean, spillover effects, or both, reported an estimated 13-29 percent reduction in all types of injury crashes, a 24 percent reduction in right-angle injury crashes, and a nonsignificant 18 percent reduction in rear-end injury crashes (Aeron-Thomas and Hess, 2005).

Red light cameras have proven to be controversial in some US communities, but the number of communities that implemented camera programs during 1992-2010 has increased dramatically, from no communities in 1992 to 25 communities in 2000 and 501 communities in 2010 (Figure 1).

Numerous studies have examined the effects of red light camera enforcement on all crashes or crashes involving injury, but few if any studies have examined the effects on fatal crashes. The present study evaluated the effect of camera enforcement on per capita fatal crash rates for large US cities. Changes in per capita rates of fatal red light running crashes were compared for cities with and without camera programs. Because prior research reported citywide effects of red light cameras on all crashes at signalized intersections, the present study also examined changes in the rates of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections in these cities.

2. Method

Large US cities were defined in this study as those with more than 200,000 residents; there were 99 such cities in 2008 (US Census Bureau, 2009). Information on red light camera programs in these 99 cities was obtained from news reports and calls to city police departments or public works departments. For cities with camera enforcement, program start and end dates were obtained. Other historical information was sought but was not available for all cities, including the number of cameras and number of signalized intersections over time.

Calendar years 2004-08, the latest 5 years for which fatal crash data were available, represented the "after" study period. Calendar years 1992-96 represented the "before" study period; very few US communities had camera programs during this time (Figure 1). The 14 cities with camera programs during 2004-08 but not during 1992-96 comprised the camera group. The 48 cities without camera programs during either time period comprised the comparison group. Of the remaining cities, 4 cities implemented camera programs prior to 1997, and 33 cities had camera programs for some but not all of the 2004-08 period. These 37 cities were excluded from analyses.

Data on fatal crashes at intersections with signal lights were extracted for 1992-96 and 2004-08 from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), which contains detailed information on all fatal motor vehicle crashes occurring on US public roads (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1992-96, 2004-08). Fatal red light running crashes were defined as the subset of these crashes that involved a driver traveling straight who was assigned the driver level contributing factor of "failure to obey traffic control devices." This definition was developed jointly by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and Federal Highway Administration so that consistent estimates of red light running crash losses would be produced (Retting, 2006).

Annual population estimates were obtained for each city from the US Census Bureau (1997, 2009). For each city in each study period and for each crash measure, the average annual per capita fatal crash rate (crashes per million population) was calculated by summing fatal crashes across the 5-year period and then dividing by the sum of the annual population counts. This resulted in two observations (one each for the before and after periods) per city for the rate of fatal red light running crashes and for the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections. To study the citywide effect of camera enforcement on fatal crash rates, the per capita crash rates were computed for each study group for the 2004-08 period, aggregating crashes and population across the cities in each group, and these rates were compared with those for the 1992-96 period.

Using the city-specific data, Poisson regression models were used to more rigorously examine the relationship of camera enforcement and other variables with fatal crash rates. The Poisson models accounted for the covariance structure due to repeated measures because each independent unit of analysis (city) had two observations (before and after periods). Separate models were developed for the rate of fatal red light running crashes and the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections. Independent variables in the model were population density (in thousands of people per square mile for each study period), land area (in square miles for each study period), study period (after vs. before), and city group (cities with camera programs during the after period vs. cities without cameras). Land area was included because large area changes potentially could confound the relationship between camera enforcement and fatal crash rates. Census information on cities' land areas is available only from the decennial reports (US Census Bureau, 1990, 2000). Therefore, the 1990 land area data were used for the before period and the 2000 data were used for the after period. The population density during the before period was calculated as the average annual population during 1992-96 divided by the 1990 land area, and the population density during the after period was calculated as the average annual population during 2004-08 divided by the 2000 land area. An interaction variable for study period and city group tested whether crash trends were different for cities with and without camera programs. The difference in modeled crash trend between cities with camera program and those without was taken as the primary measure of effectiveness. It was interpreted as the change in fatal crash rate for cities with camera programs beyond what would have been expected absent the programs. Variables with p-values less than 0.05 were taken as statistically significant.

3. Results

The 62 large US cities studied accounted for 10 percent of the US population, 14 percent of all fatal red light running crashes, and 15 percent of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections in 2008.

Figures 2 and 3 show the percentage changes in average annual per capita fatal crash rates for cities with and without red light camera enforcement programs, respectively. Detailed population and crash data for each city are listed in Appendix A. All but two of the 14 cities with camera programs experienced reductions in the rate of fatal red light running crashes, and all but three experienced reductions in the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections (Figure 2). Among the cities with camera programs that experienced reductions in both fatal crash rates, all but one city had percentage reductions for fatal red light running crashes that were larger than those for all fatal crashes at signalized intersections. Among the 48 cities without camera programs, the pattern of changes in crash rates was much more variable. About half of the cities experienced reductions in the rate of fatal red light running crashes, and about half experienced increases. More than one-third of the cities experienced reductions in the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections (Figure 3).

Table 1 lists combined results for the camera and comparison groups. The average annual rate of fatal red light running crashes declined for both study groups, but the decline was larger for cities with camera programs than for cities without cameras (35 vs. 14 percent). The average annual rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections decreased by 14 percent for cities with camera programs and increased slightly (2 percent) for cities without cameras. For cities with camera programs, the percentage decline in the annual average rate of fatal red light running crashes was much higher than the decline in the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections (35 vs. 14 percent).

Table 2 lists results of the Poisson regression model that estimated the effects of red light camera enforcement and other predictors on the per capita rate of fatal red light running crashes. No significant effect was associated with land area. After accounting for the effects of other predictors, an increase in population density (in thousands of people per square mile) reduced the rate of fatal red light running crashes by an estimated 4 percent ($[\exp(-0.0371)-1]\times100$), a marginally significant difference. After accounting for the interaction of study period and city group, the fatal crash rate during the before period was an estimated 65 percent higher ($[\exp(0.4998)-1]\times100$) for cities that later implemented camera programs compared with cities that did not. The rate of fatal red light running crashes between 1992-96 and 2004-08 was reduced by an estimated 16 percent ($[\exp(-0.1709)-1]\times100$) for cities without camera programs and by an estimated 36 percent ($[\exp(-0.1709-0.2809)-1]\times100$) for cities with cameras. The estimated effect of camera enforcement on the rate of fatal red light running crashes was obtained by interpreting the interaction term for study period and camera use directly. Based on this parameter, the rate of fatal red light running crashes during 2004-08 for cities with cameras programs was 24 percent lower ($[\exp(-0.2809)-1]\times100$) than what would have been expected without cameras.

Table 3 lists results of the Poisson regression model that estimated the effects of red light camera enforcement and other predictors on the per capita rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections. After accounting for the effects of other predictors, neither land area nor population density was significantly associated with the crash rate. After accounting for the interaction of study period and city group, the per capita rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections during the before period was an estimated 32 percent higher ($[\exp(0.2812)-1]\times100$) for cities that later implemented camera programs compared with cities that did not. The rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections between 1992-96 and 2004-08 changed only minimally for cities without camera programs and was reduced by an estimated 16 percent for cities with cameras ($[\exp(0.0112-0.1822)-1]\times100$). Based on the interaction term for study period and camera use, the actual per capita rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections during 2004-08 for cities with camera programs was 17 percent lower ($[\exp(-0.1822)-1]\times100$) than what would have been expected without cameras.

Land areas for 19 of the 62 study cities (4 camera cities and 15 comparison cities) increased by more than 10 percent between 1990 and 2000. Additional Poisson regression models were conducted that excluded these cities, and results changed little.

4. Discussion

Red light running is a frequent traffic violation, and the safety consequences have been established. Enforcing red light laws is important, but many communities do not have the resources for police to patrol intersections as often as would be needed to ticket most motorists who run red lights. Traditional police enforcement also poses special difficulties for police, who in most cases must follow a violating vehicle through a red light to stop it. This can endanger motorists and pedestrians as well as officers.

Before-after studies in communities that have implemented red light camera enforcement programs have reported reductions in red light running, not only at camera-equipped intersections but also at other signalized intersections without cameras (Retting et al., 1999a, 1999b), as well as citywide crash reductions at signalized intersections (Retting and Kyrychenko, 2002). The current study extends this research by examining the effects of camera enforcement on fatal crashes in large US cities. Based on Poisson regression models, camera programs were associated with statistically significant citywide reductions of 24 percent in the rate of fatal red light running crashes and 17 percent in the rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections, when compared with rates that would have been expected without cameras. The larger effect of camera enforcement on the rate of fatal red light running crashes would be expected because these are the crashes targeted by cameras. The significant reduction in the rate of all types of fatal crashes at signalized intersections indicates that cameras have a generalized effect on driver behavior at intersections that extends beyond running red lights.

Other factors also were found to influence fatal crash rates. Higher population densities were associated with lower fatal crash rates. A possible explanation is that denser populations generally lead to lower travel speeds and thus fewer fatal crashes (Cerrelli, 1997). Rates of fatal crashes during the baseline period were higher for cities that subsequently implemented red light camera programs than for cities that did not implement camera programs. It is to be expected that cities with larger red light running problems should have been more likely to implement camera enforcement programs.

Several limitations of the study are worth noting. The definition of red light running crashes excluded some crashes such as those involving a driver making an illegal turn on red. Other factors not considered may have influenced fatal crash rates for the camera cities but could not be examined due to limitations in the data. Attempts were made to obtain historical information on the number of red light cameras in the study cities, but information on the scope of red light programs could not be obtained for many of the cities. Historical information also was sought on the number of signalized intersections but was unavailable in many cities.

Red light cameras are not the only countermeasure for reducing crashes at signalized intersections. Converting traditional intersections to roundabouts eliminates the need for traffic signals as well as cameras. It has been reported that conversion of traditional intersections to roundabouts reduces fatal crashes by 81-90 percent, injury crashes by 25-87 percent, and overall crashes by 37-61 percent (Federal Highway Administration, 2000; Persaud et al., 2001; Schoon and van Minnen, 1994; Troutbeck, 1993). However, it is not feasible to replace every traffic light with a roundabout, and not every intersection is appropriate for a roundabout. Better enforcement of traffic signals using cameras is a solution that can be implemented quickly on a large scale.

In tallying the costs and benefits of camera enforcement, communities should factor in the considerable social and economic benefits of successfully reducing crashes. Besides foregone medical costs, vehicle repair bills, travel delays, and lost income, citizens in communities with camera enforcement experience direct savings in terms of reduced police time to investigate and report crashes, lessened need for emergency response service, and lower roadway cleanup costs.

National surveys of drivers and surveys conducted in cities with and without red light camera programs have found that a large majority support camera enforcement (Garber et al., 2005; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004; Retting and Williams, 2000). Despite the widespread support and the safety benefits of red light camera enforcement, cameras remain controversial in some communities where opponents raise concerns about "big brother" government tactics and claim that violators are victims of revenue-generating government schemes. In the current study, the cities that implemented red light camera programs had higher baseline crash rates, suggesting that government officials were motivated by safety concerns. Although automated traffic enforcement is not a panacea, the current study adds to the large body of evidence that red light cameras can prevent the most serious crashes. This evidence should be considered by communities seeking to reduce crashes at intersections.

Acknowledgements

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Table 1
Average annual per capita rates of fatal red light running crashes and all fatal crashes at signalized intersections for cities with and without red light camera enforcement programs, 1992-96 and 2004-08

	14 cities with camera programs			48 cities without camera programs		
	1992-96	2004-08	Percent change	1992-96	2004-08	Percent change
Average annual population (million)	9.02	10.08	11.7	17.07	19.08	11.7
Number of fatal red light running crashes	323	235	-27.2	409	391	-4.4
Number of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections	739	707	-4.3	1112	1266	13.8
Average annual rate of fatal red light running crashes per million population	7.16	4.66	-34.9	4.79	4.10	-14.4
Average annual rate of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections per million population	16.38	14.02	-14.4	13.02	13.27	1.9

Table 2
Poisson model of the effects of red light camera enforcement on average annual per capita rate of fatal red light running crashes

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	p value
Intercept	1.7050	0.1547	<0.0001
Land area in square miles	0.0001	0.0003	0.6391
Population density (thousands of persons per square mile)	-0.0371	0.0191	0.0527
After period (2004-08) vs. before period (1992-96)	-0.1709	0.0678	0.0117
Cities that implemented red light cameras vs. cities that did not	0.4998	0.1436	0.0005
Interaction of study period and city group	-0.2809	0.1079	0.0092

Table 3
Poisson model of the effects of red light camera enforcement on average annual per capita rates of all fatal crashes at signalized intersections

Parameter	Estimate	Standard error	p value
Intercept	2.5994	0.1314	<0.0001
Land area in square miles	0.0002	0.0002	0.3805
Population density (thousands of persons per square mile)	-0.0187	0.0160	0.2428
After period (2004-08) vs. before period (1992-96)	0.0112	0.0564	0.8426
Cities that implemented red light cameras vs. cities that did not	0.2812	0.1284	0.0285
Interaction of study period and city group	-0.1822	0.0914	0.0462



Fig. 1. US communities with red light camera enforcement programs, 1992-2010



Fig. 2. Percent change in average annual per capita fatal crash rates for 14 large US cities with red light camera enforcement programs, 2004-08 vs. 1992-96



Fig. 3: Percent change in average annual per capita fatal crash rates for 48 large US cities without red light camera enforcement programs, 2004-08 vs. 1992-96

Appendix A

Population, crash counts, per capita crash rates, and changes in per capita crash rates for each study city for fatal red light running crashes and all fatal crashes at signalized intersections, 2004-2008 vs. 1992-1996

	Average annual population		Fatal red light running crashes: 5-year total crash counts		Fatal red light running crashes: Annual crash rate per 100,000 population		Fatal red light running crashes: Percent change in crash rate	All fatal crashes at signalized intersections: 5-year total crash counts		All fatal crashes at signalized intersections: Annual crash rate per 100,000 population		All fatal crashes at signalized intersections: Percent change in crash rate
	1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08		1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08	
Cities with red light camera programs												
Bakersfield, CA	203,797	301,102	7	16	0.69	1.06	55	14	28	1.37	1.86	35
Baltimore, MD	699,943	640,054	14	11	0.40	0.34	-14	32	44	0.91	1.37	50
Chandler, AZ	119,198	241,729	7	3	1.17	0.25	-79	16	8	2.68	0.66	-75
Chicago, IL	2,799,671	2,824,206	69	47	0.49	0.33	-32	175	170	1.25	1.20	-4
Garland, TX	187,241	215,403	7	6	0.75	0.56	-25	13	11	1.39	1.02	-26
Long Beach, CA	430,595	464,451	14	10	0.65	0.43	-34	32	23	1.49	0.99	-33
Phoenix, AZ	1,098,702	1,509,114	100	76	1.82	1.01	-45	197	190	3.59	2.52	-30
Portland, OR	497,777	541,682	18	8	0.72	0.30	-59	42	31	1.69	1.14	-32
Raleigh, NC	241,617	364,026	3	9	0.25	0.49	99	6	24	0.50	1.32	165
Sacramento, CA	400,480	452,320	15	8	0.75	0.35	-53	24	24	1.20	1.06	-11
San Diego, CA	1,161,107	1,291,335	26	11	0.45	0.17	-62	76	51	1.31	0.79	-40
Santa Ana, CA	298,297	336,783	11	7	0.74	0.42	-44	21	18	1.41	1.07	-24
Toledo, OH	322,241	316,835	10	6	0.62	0.38	-39	25	24	1.55	1.51	-2
Washington, DC	563,014	584,461	22	17	0.78	0.58	-26	66	61	2.34	2.09	-11
Cities without red light camera programs												
Akron, OH	218,976	209,668	2	2	0.18	0.19	4	8	4	0.73	0.38	-48
Anaheim, CA	282,074	330,345	12	13	0.85	0.79	-7	24	20	1.70	1.21	-29
Anchorage, AK	249,365	278,125	9	11	0.72	0.79	10	20	23	1.60	1.65	3
Arlington, VA	173,359	202,500	3	1	0.35	0.10	-71	9	3	1.04	0.30	-71
Aurora, CO	242,283	303,791	5	7	0.41	0.46	12	17	22	1.40	1.45	3
Birmingham, AL	256,388	231,578	14	7	1.09	0.60	-45	25	24	1.95	2.07	6
Boise, ID	154,806	201,372	0	1	0.00	0.10	N/A	3	4	0.39	0.40	3
Boston, MA	553,977	617,749	5	3	0.18	0.10	-46	21	11	0.76	0.36	-53
Buffalo, NY	316,662	275,641	4	4	0.25	0.29	15	26	24	1.64	1.74	6
Chesapeake, VA	179,792	217,583	0	2	0.00	0.18	N/A	5	7	0.56	0.64	16
Chula Vista, CA	146,629	211,660	2	4	0.27	0.38	39	6	11	0.82	1.04	27
Cincinnati, OH	352,050	332,341	2	4	0.11	0.24	112	8	9	0.45	0.54	19
Colorado Springs, CO	315,112	395,544	11	10	0.70	0.51	-28	27	34	1.71	1.72	0
Detroit, MI	1,007,094	918,776	46	20	0.91	0.44	-52	111	68	2.20	1.48	-33
Durham, NC	160,985	211,713	3	5	0.37	0.47	27	8	10	0.99	0.94	-5
Fort Wayne, IN	200,085	251,663	5	4	0.50	0.32	-36	14	10	1.40	0.79	-43

	Average annual population		Fatal red light running crashes					All fatal crashes at signalized intersections				
			5-year total crash counts		Annual crash rate per 100,000 population		Percent change in crash rate	5-year total crash counts		Annual crash rate per 100,000 population		Percent change in crash rate
	1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08		1992-96	2004-08	1992-96	2004-08	
Henderson, NV	86,311	239,939	1	3	0.23	0.25	8	5	8	1.16	0.67	-42
Hialeah, FL	204,090	220,141	3	3	0.29	0.27	-7	21	24	2.06	2.18	6
Honolulu, HI	390,745	374,348	5	2	0.26	0.11	-58	27	34	1.38	1.82	31
Indianapolis, IN	745,367	793,282	18	23	0.48	0.58	20	48	51	1.29	1.29	0
Jacksonville, FL	664,626	795,745	13	7	0.39	0.18	-55	38	79	1.14	1.99	74
Jersey City, NJ	229,201	237,973	4	0	0.35	0.00	-100	15	6	1.31	0.50	-61
Kansas City, MO	434,600	469,728	15	13	0.69	0.55	-20	33	39	1.52	1.66	9
Laredo, TX	152,870	210,741	2	3	0.26	0.28	9	5	12	0.65	1.14	74
Las Vegas, NV	334,750	550,914	10	22	0.60	0.80	34	33	47	1.97	1.71	-13
Lexington, Fayette, KY	236,005	283,144	6	8	0.51	0.57	11	13	27	1.10	1.91	73
Lincoln, NE	204,472	244,961	4	2	0.39	0.16	-58	5	11	0.49	0.90	84
Louisville, KY	670,350	706,926	17	18	0.51	0.51	0	28	47	0.84	1.33	59
Madison, WI	204,138	226,575	3	1	0.29	0.09	-70	9	6	0.88	0.53	-40
Memphis, TN	619,267	680,035	36	27	1.16	0.79	-32	73	69	2.36	2.03	-14
Miami, FL	362,845	407,606	5	14	0.28	0.69	149	35	67	1.93	3.29	70
Milwaukee, WI	606,704	602,397	14	17	0.46	0.56	22	37	44	1.22	1.46	20
Nashville, TN	502,398	585,422	8	13	0.32	0.44	39	34	43	1.35	1.47	9
Newark, NJ	271,809	276,721	12	6	0.88	0.43	-51	39	25	2.87	1.81	-37
Norfolk, VA	246,229	237,800	4	2	0.32	0.17	-48	8	6	0.65	0.50	-22
Oklahoma City, OK	459,474	539,146	1	5	0.04	0.19	326	12	29	0.52	1.08	106
Omaha, NE	371,308	437,344	15	17	0.81	0.78	-4	29	32	1.56	1.46	-6
Pittsburgh, PA	358,173	314,869	1	4	0.06	0.25	355	12	22	0.67	1.40	109
Reno, NV	148,367	209,923	4	3	0.54	0.29	-47	19	9	2.56	0.86	-67
Rochester, NY	225,908	209,022	2	3	0.18	0.29	62	12	17	1.06	1.63	53
Saint Paul, MN	262,938	277,799	7	6	0.53	0.43	-19	13	8	0.99	0.58	-42
Saint Petersburg, FL	237,878	246,461	13	6	1.09	0.49	-55	28	28	2.35	2.27	-3
San Antonio, TX	1,068,009	1,292,560	27	25	0.51	0.39	-23	68	64	1.27	0.99	-22
San Jose, CA	813,785	921,760	13	14	0.32	0.30	-5	29	40	0.71	0.87	22
Tampa, FL	283,464	330,769	8	10	0.56	0.60	7	26	42	1.83	2.54	38
Tulsa, OK	376,458	383,293	9	7	0.48	0.37	-24	15	18	0.80	0.94	18
Wichita, KS	322,887	358,229	5	7	0.31	0.39	26	9	22	0.56	1.23	120
Winston, Salem, NC	167,987	220,383	1	2	0.12	0.18	52	2	6	0.24	0.54	129